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A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is an entity that reliably provides a unique response to a 
given challenge and cannot be easily duplicated physically. PUFs are an alternative to using non-volatile 
memory (NVM) for secure key storage. NVMs are susceptible to reverse engineering and side channel 
attacks that can extract sensitive data. PUFs take advantage of random physical variations that are 
introduced during manufacturing. PUFs can be used to create digital fingerprints as secret keys for 
cryptographic algorithms or for device authentication. SRAM PUFs, in particular, are of great interest due 
to their omnipresence in electronics. One of the weaknesses of SRAM PUFs is their reliability as noise 
and other environmental effects reduce the reproducibility of the PUF.  
This thesis provides an in depth analysis of the 6T SRAM PUF and 8T soft error robust SRAM 
PUF at the transistor level and provides a methodology to design a reliable PUF. We hypothesize that the 
VGS of pull up and pull down transistors during the power up phase affects PUF reliability. Transistors 
with a larger VGS have higher drive strength and more influence over the start-up value of the PUF. 
Changing the sizing ratio of PMOS to NMOS devices changes the VGS. Nominal simulations recorded 
VGS in relation to the VDD ramp-up to predict which devices have a higher influence on start up values. 
Two types of PUF schemes: VDD manipulation and GND manipulation are simulated. Monte Carlo 
simulations are performed within the Cadence Virtuoso environment using TSMC general purpose 
CMOS kit. The reliability metric is called the assured response which is the number of Monte Carlo 
samples that show a consistent response over 100 power ups. 
The results from VGS dependency analysis and isolated mismatch show a clear trend between VGS 
and the type of device that determines PUF reliability. Devices with higher VGS during VGS dependency 
analysis show a larger drop in assured response when their mismatch is disabled in the isolated mismatch 
simulation. Sizing sweeps show that skewed designs have higher assured response than less skewed 
designs. This is because smaller transistors have poor matching properties and relatively higher VGS which 
contribute to improved reliability. VDD manipulation and GND manipulation showed similar levels of 
reliability while 6T performed better than 8T. In an effort to improve the 8T PUF, a split VDD scheme is 
proposed which introduces a delay between two VDD signals in the cell. This shows a 3% improvement 
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The internet of things (IoT) is a growing network of internet-connected everyday devices that can 
send and receive information with minimal human interaction. In the present, many devices such as our 
mobile phones and vehicles are connected to the internet. The development of the internet of things has 
substantially increased the number of connected devices. Gartner Inc estimates 25 billion devices across 
the glove in 2020 whereas today it is estimated that there are around 6-9 billion devices connected [1][2]. 
With increased connectivity comes a greater need for security, as new avenues of attack become open and 
exploitable by criminals or cyber terrorists if not properly secured.  
1.2 Wi-Fi Vulnerabilities 
The development of wireless communications is one of the milestones of the information age; 
however, it is not without a cost to security. This section discusses several types of attacks that can hijack 
or disrupt communication through the Wi-Fi medium. 
Denial-of-Service is a type of attack that disrupts the normal operation of a server. The attacker is 
able to overload a server by making superfluous requests for resources and prevents intended users from 
accessing the resources. The 802.11 framework also allows requests to de-authenticate clients or access 
points which the attacker can manipulate to deny service to individual clients or an entire channel [3].  
These types of attacks are possible on 802.11 Wi-Fi protocol, which makes it possible for attackers to be 
physically located anywhere with a Wi-Fi connection. 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks are used to eavesdrop and hijack communication in order to steal 
valuable information and distort messages between clients and servers [4]. An attacker will insert 
themselves between sender and receiver and impersonate both of them well enough that the other is 
satisfied. For example, this can be used to steal banking information by redirecting users to a fake online 
banking site that collecting login data.  
Replay attacks involve eavesdropping that copying a message stream and resending it with the 
receiver perceiving it as legitimate. If not properly secured this technique can be used to intercept hashed 
keys and replay them to be granted access. The list of attacks continues but these vulnerabilities illustrate 
the need to advance security technologies. 
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1.3 Current Security Methods 
Today, non-volatile memory (NVM) is a common way of hiding security related information. 
NVM can be discrete or embedded. Discrete NVMs are cheaper but have external pins that can be probed 
by an attacker [5]. Embedded NVMs do not have exposed pins but are expensive. Fuses are an example of 
NVM that can be used to store secrets but are vulnerable to reverse engineering attacks since blown fuses, 
can be physically observed and read out. Fabricating embedded NVM requires up to 15 additional masks 
and process steps [6] on top of standard CMOS process. Sometimes embedded NVM is not available in 
newer technology nodes so if it is needed, older technology must be used [5]. 
1.4 Attacks on NVM 
Attacks can be classified into three different categories: invasive attacks, semi invasive attacks and 
non-invasive attacks. Invasive attacks require direct physical access to the device and expensive 
equipment to analyze the structure of the device. Non-invasive techniques are non-destructive and do not 
require initial preparation of the device under test. Semi invasive attacks require moderate access as de-
packaging of the device is needed just like in invasive attacks but do not require expensive equipment to 
perform. 
1.4.1 Invasive 
Reverse engineering attacks involve analyzing the circuit structure through product teardown, 
system level/process analysis and circuit extraction. This can provide information, on how the encryption 
algorithm works, where keys are stored and critical areas to probe for further analysis [7] 
Micro-probing is a functional analysis using signal generators, logic analyzers, and oscilloscopes to 
provide input and observe the behavior of the circuit. This can be used to extract keys from NVM by 
providing information on how the encryption algorithm works [7]. 
1.4.2 Semi invasive 
Modification attacks on EEPROM are possible using microprobes by setting and resetting target 
bits in order to break the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm [8]. It is possible to modify bits by 
shining UV light on small sections of memory. By setting specific bits and observing parity error 
messages, it is possible to determine the contents of the memory which is typically read protected. It is 
also possible to modify special write protect bits to prevent the codes from being erased [9]. This type of 
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attack is cheaper than invasive attacks since inexpensive equipment can be used to breach the passivation 
layer. Fault attacks rely on inducing faults by manipulating internal or external signals in order to obtain 
an information leak. There are many fault attacks such as glitch attacks that cause the CPU into a wrong 
execution path, manipulating write/read/erase operations [9]. 
1.4.3 Non-Invasive attacks  
Non-invasive attacks do not damage the device but analyze the behavior of the device under 
irregular conditions to extract secured information. Non-invasive attacks are also known as side channel 
attacks and there are many different forms of these attacks. One popular form of side channel attack is the 
power analysis. A Power analysis analyzes the relationship between data and the power dissipated. By 
collecting many power measurements on the MSB for plaintext and calculating the difference between the 
means for a 1 and a 0, estimation can be made on which byte a power trace corresponds to. Knowing the 
encryption algorithm then allows a key to be deciphered [10]. 
Timing attacks are another form of side channel attacks that analyzes the amount of time a logic 
operation takes. This is a useful attack on algorithms with dependence on timing variation such as in [11].  
It is also possible to analyze the radiation being emitted by the device and correlate the amount of 
radiation to the type logic operation being performed. This form attack is also a side channel attack since 






PUFs are physical one-way functions that provide a response when presented a challenge. A PUF 
needs to perform reliably and provide unpredictable but unique responses. One analogy is that PUFs 
provide a fingerprint for a device much like a human fingerprint. A challenge in a PUF constitutes a 
physical stimulus and the response is a function of the physical arrangement of the PUF and 
environmental conditions. A PUF has the following properties 
• Evaluable: A PUF needs to be easily evaluable in order to keep power, area, and cost down.  
• Reliable: A reliable PUF entails that the same response is generated for a particular challenge. 
Typically, PUFs are arranged in words, each corresponding to a key. The metric used is the intra-
hamming distance, which is the sum of different bits between the sample challenge and a 
reference (golden response). Reliability in PUFs does not have to be perfect but needs to be high 
enough that errors can be corrected with Error Correction Codes ECC or minimized through 
majority voting schemes. 
• Unclonable: This means that knowledge of the response of a particular PUF provides no 
information on the function. The function is ideally impossible to model and in word based PUFs 
the metric is inter-hamming distance. This property prevents attackers from cloning the PUF. 
Half of the bits should match if each bit is truly independent which corresponds to an inter-
hamming distance of 50%. On the other hand, the PUF response space needs to be large enough 
such that the collisions are practically impossible. This is because PUFs are unaware of the 
responses of other PUFs so a collision is mathematically possible. This issue is much like the 
birthday problem where there is a 50% chance that two people share the same birthday in a room 
with 23 people. 
2.1 Use Cases 
2.1.1 Supply chain management 
Currently, barcodes are a popular form of product tracking in commerce. They are cheap and can 
be printed in the same processing step as the rest of the label. They are very limited in the sense that they 
only identify what type of product it is.  RFIDs can bound a tag to a good but is not in use due to extra 
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processing steps compared to barcodes. This increases production costs to a point that RFIDs are 
considered economically unfeasible. PUFs are a way of bringing down the cost of the RFID. One reason 
is that PUFs would replace ROM required on a tag to provide an ID. Another reason is that the ID comes 
almost for free with the tag so no enrollment is needed as is the case with barcodes. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 RFID in supply chain [13] 
 
In Figure 2.1 the usage of a PUF-RFID tag utilized for item identification is shown: Near the start of the 
supply chain the merchandise must be registered and the enrollment information is stored in a database. 
The PUF-ID of each item must be assigned to an article-ID. The article-ID gets unique properties of the 
associated good. Moreover, properties such as expiry date and the date sold can be stored to aid 
consumers or producers and retailers. In point A in Figure 2.1, all delivered goods on a pallet are scanned 
registered at once. The pallet itself has a barcode that gives some general details. This barcode is then 
scanned and the data is assigned to every RFID on the pallet. The products are then shipped to the stores 
and scanned again to track their location in the supply chain. The customer then picks up the item like 
they normally would and can walk out the door and pay simultaneously through the RFID. The 
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advantages of this technology are numerous. Costs in staffing can be reduced, especially at checkout 
where billing can be performed automatically. Today, self-checkouts are implemented at retailers such as 
Walmart and Zehrs. Inventory management is simplified and human error is reduced across various roles 
in retail. The time-tested problem of queue management at checkouts is solved. There are challenges that 
arise as well, such as the need for RFID compatible equipment. Scanning needs to be able to cover long 
distances in order to be advantageous to barcode scanning. Also, many producers now have to modify 
their production lines to accommodate RFIDs, which can be costly. For the time being, the costs of 
implementing RFIDs outweigh the benefits which mean barcodes will be used until cheaper RFIDs can be 
developed. 
2.1.2 FPGA code protection 
Field Programmable Gate Array or FPGA is a versatile reconfigurable integrated circuit which is 
very popular due to its fast time to market. In times when the code on the FPGA is proprietary, attackers 
can clone the code which is stored in its NVM. There are methods of protecting this code [14] but 
nevertheless, there are vulnerabilities during data transfer to the FPGA. Encrypting the code with a key is 
one way of combating this. During the startup phase, the encrypted configuration files are loaded into the 
volatile memory of the FPGA.  
 
Figure 2.2 FPGA with encrypted configuration system[13] 
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Figure 2.2 shows the encryption process using traditional NVM key storage. First, an enrollment is done 
after the device is created and the key is stored inside the FPGA NVM. The encrypted configuration is 
stored outside the FPGA which attackers will have access to but do not have a key for. When 
reconfiguration is requested the key is read from the NVM and used to decrypt the configuration for use. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 FPGA with PUF code protection: (a) Enrollment phase: helper data is generated; (b) 
Storing the encrypted configuration data; (c) FPGA configuration [13] 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the PUF FPGA code protection scheme. Amid the 
enrollment stage, the framework is set up to unscramble the configuration file. This must be done in a 
trusted and secure location. The key is then sent to the FPGA. Inside, the PUF cells are read out. The 
result is utilized to mask the key and helper data (HD) is generated to assist in key generation. At this 
point, the key can be regenerated and used for decrypting. 
2.1.3 Counterfeiting 
Counterfeiting ICs has a huge impact on the economy of the semiconductor industry. It is estimated 
that companies lose about $100 billion of revenue each year due to counterfeiting [15]. It also poses a 
reliability and safety hazard especially in the automotive, military, and medical sectors where defective 
parts lead to equipment failure and possibly harm humans.  Counterfeit ICs can exist as non-authorized 
copies of designs, non-authorized manufacturing of original designs or underperforming/defective ICs 
that are marketed as new and within specifications. Non-authorized manufacturing can occur when 
production is outsourced from a design company to a manufacturing and the manufacturer decides to 
create more products than requested and sells them illegally. This can be combated by identifying unique 
features in the product for tracking and identification. PUFs can be used to verify that the original 
equipment manufacturer indeed created the device to be used by the consumer. They can also be used as 
keys or key generators to encrypt messages in a public/private key protocol. Typically, secret keys are 
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stored in on-chip fuses, a form of NVM.  Counterfeiters can clone devices by reading the key of a genuine 
device through invasive or non-invasive techniques and then reuse the key in order to get past 
authentication protocols. 
2.2 PUF in Security Architecture 
Because of the way that PUFs generate responses from the intrinsic properties of a device, random 
number generation and key storage does not have to be done outside of the chip. This reduces overhead 
and diminishes expenses substantially. This fact alone can make the difference between a competitive and 
a mediocre product. 
In situations where a device is utilized for identification purposes, a unique ID must be accessible. 
Most systems today are storing IDs in NVMs. A chip without NVM is normally less expensive to deliver, 
on the grounds that additional processing steps are required in fabrication. This unique ID must be 
produced outside the chip and later transferred back which causes increased expenses. Using a PUF 
bypasses these issues since the ID is inherently available on chip. 
2.2.1 Device authentication 
Device authentication is a way of preventing counterfeiting by querying devices for a response. 
Typically when a device is created, a secret key is also created and stored on the device NVM and host 
database. This storing of this key is typically done in a trusted and secure environment to prevent keys 
from leaking out to potential attackers. When the device is shipped off to customers and customers, the 
key is read out of the NVM and checked against the database. If a match is found the device is considered 
authentic and access is granted. The problem with this operation is that when the device is shipped outside 






Figure 2.4 Typical device authentication with NVM 
 
Figure 2.5 Device authentication with PUF 
In Figure 2.5, instead of storing keys in memory, the keys are in the form of CRPs. When the device is 
created, it is issued a challenge and provides the response which is stored in a database. There is no need 
to store the response in an NVM as it is generated on the fly when the challenge is issued. The 
corresponding response to a challenge must be given for authentication to be successful. To prevent man 
in the middle attacks, the CRPs are used only once and discarded. 
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2.2.2 Secure key generation 
PUF output can be used to generate volatile secret keys but require error code correction (ECC). 
This is because a perfect match is required which is difficult to obtain under noise and other 
environmental conditions. 
 
Figure 2.6 Secure key generation scheme 
Figure 2.6 shows an overview of a secure key generation scheme with a PUF [16]. When the device is 
first created, its response is recorded, helper data and a public syndrome is generated for error correction 
purposes.  The syndrome provides information on where bit errors are. This syndrome is public and could 
be figured out by attackers so it is important to have more secret bits than ECC bits. When a key is needed 
the PUF is challenged and the response is passed through error correction in case the response has 
changed.  The response is then hashed according to the desired security algorithm in order to generate the 
key. 
2.2.3 Random seed generator 
Random number generation (RNG) is important for cryptography in order to generate keys that 
cannot be deduced by modeling how the key was generated. RNG generators are either truly random or 
pseudo random where a seed can perfectly reproduce a set of random numbers if the same set is needed 




2.3.1 Symmetric key algorithms 
In this type of algorithm, the key is shared by sender and receiver with no restrictions on the keys, 
which relaxes specifications on the PUF. Examples of symmetric key algorithms include Advanced 
Encryption Standard AES and DES. AES is more popular due to longer key lengths. Longer key lengths 
hinder brute force attacks, which try every single combination of keys. 
2.3.2 Public key cryptography 
Also known as asymmetric key cryptography, this type of algorithm uses different keys for the 
sender and receiver. It is called public since one of these keys is visible to the public. The private key 
used by the sender to encrypt the message and the public key is used by the sender to decrypt the 
message. This allows the receiver to verify the origins of the message and is used in authentication. One 
disadvantage is that the keys need to satisfy special mathematical properties in order to be used. Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman Encryption (RSA) and elliptic curve cryptography are examples of public key 
algorithms [17]. Another downside is the increased complexity and higher power consumption. PUFs can 
be used a key for these purposes, however, PUFs typically have bit errors at the output and require error 
correction. ECC is a is one major research area for PUFs since cryptographic keys require perfect 
reproducibility of the key. 
2.4 Classification of PUFs 
2.4.1 Strong PUF 
Strong PUFs have many challenge and response pairs which are useful for having authentication 
protocols that only allow one use of each CRP before it must be discarded. This allows access to the 
challenge response system to be lax so attackers are able to issue challenges and read responses. 
However, due to the large number of CRPs, this does not provide useful information. As long as there is 
no correlation between the pairs it is impossible to model the system.[18] 
2.4.2 Weak PUF 
Weak PUFs have a small number of challenge and response pairs and this means that access to the 
challenge response system should have restricted access such that attackers cannot read the responses 
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even if they physically possess the PUF [18]. Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) PUFs are the most 
popular form of weak PUFs which utilize threshold voltage (Vt) variation as the physical phenomenon 
that creates the digital signature. Manufacturing variation due to RDF and line edge roughness affects the 
Vt and creates an imbalance within the SRAM. The challenge response mechanism typically involves 
putting the SRAM PUF in a metastable state followed by the challenge which will enable the SRAM to 
self-evaluate to stable state which is primarily affected by the threshold variation. There are many 
methods of evaluation for SRAM PUF and a common technique is the power up. This is where the initial 
state is when the PUF does not have power and all storage nodes contain a logic 0 which is the metastable 
state. The VDD is then powered on and the SRAM evaluates based on its physical parameters and 
environmental conditions. Environmental conditions can include temperature and noise which can cause 
the SRAM to evaluate to another state rather than its preferred state. Temperature can affect the ramp up 
time which has been observed to cause a change in reliability [19]. 
2.5 Types of PUFs 
2.5.1 Ring oscillator (RO) PUF 
A ring oscillator consists of an odd number of inverters joined in a ring fashion. An odd number 
allows the RO to oscillate with a frequency equal to twice the sum of the delays through the inverters. It is 
typically used in a phase lock loop but it has useful properties that make it a viable PUF. Due to process 
variation, the frequencies will be slightly different due to the variation in delay between gates. A single 
PUF bit can be created by comparing the frequencies between ROs. In the figure below, multiplexers are 
used to select the ROs to be compared and counters are used to measure the frequency. A comparator 
assigns a 1 or 0 based on which RO is faster. 
2.5.2 Arbiter PUF 
The Arbiter PUF is a strong PUF that consists of pairs of 2-1 multiplexers connected in series with 
an output D-latch as seen in Figure 2.7 [20]. The same input signal is connected to all inputs of the 
multiplexer in the first stage so there are initially four input signals but only two will proceed through the 
first multiplexer. The control signals to the multiplexers determine the path that will be taken by the input 
signals. This can be used as a PUF since the electrical paths are identical by design but variations create a 
slightly different delay between the paths. The response is determined which signal reaches the D latch 
first. If D is first then the response is a 1 and vice versa. The control signals provide the challenge and it is 
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clear that the number of challenges increases exponentially with the number of stages which is a benefit 
of the arbiter PUF. However, one downside to the Arbiter PUF is its susceptibility to modeling 
attacks[20]. 
 
Figure 2.7 Arbiter PUF 
2.5.3 SRAM PUF 
The SRAM PUF is a weak PUF based on the positive feedback and exploiting metastability 
inherent to SRAMs. SRAMs are symmetrical by design but manufacturing variations cause an imbalance. 
SRAM PUFs are popular due to the ubiquitous nature of SRAMs in devices and their ease of use. This 
entails low overhead which is a desirable characteristic in terms of economics. A simple power up scheme 
is sufficient for PUF operation. SRAMs are volatile in nature which means attacks to obtain secrets from 
the SRAM are futile while power is off. 
2.5.3.1 Metastability 
To illustrate the concept of metastability in a SRAM, imagine a ball on top of a hill (Figure 2.8). 
The ideal case occurs when the ball stays on top of the hill and does not roll down. This case is analogous 
to a SRAM with no manufacturing variation and therefore no bias towards either a logic 0 or logic 1. 
With a real system, the ball will have a stronger bias to a particular state and will roll towards that state 
with a high probability. The small arrows represent a small chance that the system can resolve to that 
state, depending on environmental conditions. 
           
Figure 2.8 (a) Unbiased metastable system (b) Strong logic 0 bias (c) Strong logic 1 bias 
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The butterfly curve in Figure 2.9 illustrates the states. The red state is metastable. In reality, any noise at 
M1 will cause the system to shift to one of the stable states. The blue states are the stable states reinforced 
by positive feedback when power is applied. The 45-degree line from the origin is the line where 
VQ=VQB. Initially, the system is at the origin where no charge is present. Next, the power begins to ramp 
up and as this happens both voltages rise at the same rate. After some time, the difference in Vt between 
the left and right inverter starts to separate the nodes and the positive feedback mechanism takes over and 
swings the system to one of the blue stable states. This example shows a case where there is a bias 
towards S1. Under ideal conditions, M1 should be on the VQ=VQB line. 
 
Figure 2.9 A 6T SRAM PUF butterfly curve is shown. The cell has a bias towards S1 since the 
VQ=VQB line is above M1. 
High error rates are one weakness of SRAM-based PUFs. The error rates of SRAM PUFs are generally 
higher than those of pure PUF circuits. The designers of pure PUF circuits have the freedom to enhance 
local mismatches and to limit the impact of noise. In many PUF designs, ECC is utilized to decrease the 
error rate. Since SRAM PUFs demonstrate high error rates as much as 10%, ECC cannot correct all 
PUFs. Many ECC schemes are too complex, making it practically infeasible in some microcontrollers. 
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2.5.4 Delay hardened PUF 
Researchers [21] recently described a hybrid PUF by Intel that utilizes metastability in a bistable 
element along with delay variation to improve reliability. The hybrid PUF also counteracts aging by using 
burn techniques to purposely bias the PUF towards the favored state. The burn in technique uses high 
temperature and high voltage to achieve this. This technique shows a 13% reduction in unstable bits and 
can be with ECC, Temporal Majority Voting (TMV) and unstable bit masking to further improve the 
reliability. 
2.5.4.1 Repetition code 
Repetition code is a simple but very effective method of lowering the bit error rate (BER) in 
SRAMs. It uses a form of spatial majority voting as redundancy. This means that the more bits that are 
used in the voting process, the lower the error rate. First, an odd number of bits are XORed with the first 
bit in the group and the result is the code.  Next, when the SRAM is given a challenge, the raw output is 
XORed with the code and a majority vote is made. If there are more 1s than 0s than the output is a 1 and 
vice versa [22]. The output will be wrong if a majority of the bits flip so a tradeoff exists between 
reducing BER and the number of bits needed for a single PUF bit. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Repetition code generation 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Repetition code usage 
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2.5.4.2 Temporal majority voting 
Temporal majority voting [21] uses a counter to mitigate errors that occur over time due to noise. 
As shown in Figure 2.12 an N bit counter is used with a PUF cell and the value of the nth bit is the result 
of the TMV process after 2n+1-1 cycles. If the nth bit is used this is called TMV(2 n+1) for n>0. For 
example, if the 2nd bit is used, there will be 3 cycles of voting and a decimal result of 3 or 2 have a 1 in 
the 2nd bit position meaning that the majority or cycles have chosen a 1. 
 
Figure 2.12 TMV scheme 
 
2.6 Mismatch Properties of Transistors 
In MOSFETs, there are two types of manufacturing variation, global and local. The local mismatch 
is derived from stochastic differences between nearby devices that cannot be controlled through 
production means.    
Global mismatches originate from working procedures of a present day fabrication facility [23]. 
The global variation is brought on for instance by temperature gradients over the wafer amid annealing, 
by photoresist development, an etching process, or photolithographic process variations. There are layout 
techniques that aim to reduce this type of variation. 
Local mismatch is important in creating the unique fingerprint of a PUF. In deep submicron 
technology, transistor gate oxide thickness is only a few nanometers thick and can vary up to 50% on a 
single device [24]. This affects carrier mobility and gate tunneling. In bulk CMOS, local mismatch is 
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influenced by Random dopant fluctuations (RDF), line edge roughness (LER), and polygate granularity 
[13].  
There are also mismatches that occur over time and usage of devices. These are called temporal 
mismatches and can further be grouped in reversible and irreversible mismatches. 
Local temperature shifts can occur when the distribution of current on a chip is uneven. This can 
cause areas with a high current to increase in temperature with respect to areas with less current. This can 
affect many characteristics such as drive current and leakage. 
Negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) is a physical degeneration which brings about an 
increase in the Vt and the subthreshold slope and a lowering of the transconductance after some time of 
negatively biased transistors. Silicon-dioxide (SiO2) is typically used as the oxide in MOSFETs. This 
contains dangling bonds Hydrogen is introduced to pacify these dangling bonds in SiO2. Given a high 
enough temperature or negative bias, some of these hydrogen atoms will displace and some will form H2 
molecules. This causes gaps left in the SiO2 that carriers must be filled, thus increasing the Vt. NBTI 
increases with growing temperature and with increasing negative gate to source voltage. 
Hot Carrier Injection can occur when charge carriers are energetic enough to overcome energy 
barriers. A long mean free path gives carriers more acceleration time and also a high electric field will 
accelerate the carriers quicker. This can cause a leakage current to appear in the gate or channel and the 
high energy of the carriers can break Si-H bonds. This creates traps which will increase the Vt in a similar 
fashion to NBTI.[25] Pelgrom’s model captures the effects of variation in a transistor into a simple 






Where N is the doping concentration, W and L are the length and width of the transistor. 𝜎𝑉𝑡 is 
the standard deviation of the Vt. There is a weak dependence on doping concentration which means that 
the area is the major determinant in Vt variation. 
Power supply variations can occur locally as well if the power grid is not designed evenly. This 
can be crucial to SRAM PUFs that use power on techniques for challenges. 
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2.7 6T Cell Background 
The ubiquitous six transistor SRAM cell is composed of a back to back inverter with two NMOS 
access transistors. It is a high density cell and is volatile so power needs to be on in order to store data. P1 
and N1 form the first transistor and P0 and N0 form the second transistor. 
 
Figure 2.13 6T cell schematic 
2.7.1 Read operation  
To illustrate a read operation assume that Q is at VDD while Qb is at 0V 
1. BL and BLB are precharged to VDD 
2. The WL is activated and current flows though N2 and N0.  
3. Qb sees a small rise in voltage as long as N0 is sized to be stronger than N2 
4. A differential voltage is formed between the two bitlines since BL is still at VDD and this 
differential is typically amplified by a sense amplifier. 
2.7.2 Write operation 
To illustrate a write operation assume that Q is at VDD while Qb is at GND. We would like to write 
a 0 into the cell. Due to the read sizing constraint, the write cannot be accomplished through the pulldown 
NMOS transistor N1. Therefore it must be accomplished through P1. 
BL is charged to 0 and BLB is charged to VDD. When the WL is turned on N3 is sending charge 
into Q while P1 is trying to maintain the charge. The access transistor needs to be sized so that it has a 
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higher drive strength than the PMOS transistors. When Q has been pulled higher than the switching 
threshold of the right inverter, positive feedback latches the cell and the write is completed. 
 
Figure 2.14 6T cell read write operations 
2.8 8T Cell Background 
The eight transistor cell was invented for low power and soft error robust SRAM applications. It 
is composed of four storage nodes as seen in Figure 2.15. [26] 
 
Figure 2.15 8T cell schematic 
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2.8.1 Read operation  
To illustrate a read operation assume that Q and Q2 are at VDD while Q2b and Qb are at 0V, BL and 
BLB are precharged to 0V.WL voltage needs to be higher than the threshold voltages of N3, but it cannot 
be too high or it will cause a destructive read. This creates a trade-off between read current and read 
stability. WL rises to 400mV which will cause Qb to rise to 400mV since Q is at VDD and N1 is on. This 
turns on transistor N3 which will pulldown Q2 and cause a logic 0 degradation on BL. Marker V1 in 
Figure 2.16 illustrates this. 
2.8.2 Write operation 
To illustrate a write operation, assume that Q and Q2 are at VDD while Q2b and Qb are at GND. We 
would like to write a 0 into the cell. 
The WL is brought to 400mV to turn on N3. Since BLB is 1, N4 charges up Q2b until the VGS of 
N4 is less than its threshold and turns off. While this is happening N3 is pulling down Q2 which occurs 
quickly once P3 turns off and the feedback mechanism takes over. Marker V2 in Figure 2.16 illustrates 
this. 
 





Noise can be categorized into white and colored noise. White noise is flat in the frequency domain 
meaning it has the same noise power across all frequencies. Colored noise has a frequency component in 
its noise power. Variation in VDD across the chip and across time can also affect PUF reliability. 
 
Thermal noise, 𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒
2 , is a form of white noise that is generated within the channel of the 
MOSFETs. It is caused by the random motion of electrons which increases with temperature. It is 
modeled as a current source in parallel with the transistor. 𝛾 is a coefficient that changes between 
processes and is empirically found and is typically 2/3 for long channel devices.[27] T represents 
temperature in kelvin, gm is the transconductance of the MOSFET and k is boltzman’s constant. 
𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒
2 = 4𝑘𝑇𝛾𝑔𝑚 
Shot noise occurs when charge carriers need to surpass a potential barrier within transistors when 
moving from the source area into the channel. Since the intersection of the barrier is a stochastic process, 
the current flow is "noisy." The power spectral density of shot noise, I2shot ?, concerning the noise current 
is [28]: 
𝐼𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡
2 = 2𝑞𝐼 
Where q is the charge on the carrier and I is the average current 
Flicker noise is believed to be caused by multiple sources including the silicon oxide interface 
where dangling bonds exist. As carriers move close to the interface, some recombine and regenerate due 
to the extra energy states present. The following equation approximates flicker noise in MOSFETs but 
real flicker noise is more complex [27]. Where K is a coefficient dependent on VGS, Cox is the oxide 






Random Telegraph Noise (RTN) occurs when a device is so small that a single trap can have a 
significant impact on transistor behavior. A single trapped charge has been observed to impact the drain 
current by as much as 10% [28]. This type of noise occurs at a low frequency which can be a problem for 





The two memory structures, 8T, and 6T memory cells were simulated. There are also two different 
challenges between analyzed called VDD manipulation and GND manipulation. The main focus of the 
simulations is on the PUF reproducibility/reliability but some insight on the uniqueness is gained. The 
first two tests aim to create a new metric for PUF reliability called ΔVGS. The tools being used for 
simulations is Cadence Virtuoso which enables schematic capture and editing, waveform viewing and 
simulations. The Spectre simulation engine is used as it allows simultaneous use of transient noise and 
Monte Carlo. Conservative settings were used due to its higher accuracy as the other preset settings 
showed issues with convergence The testbench consists of a single instance of a cell and ideal signals and 
switches to control the cell. The TSMC 65 nm general purpose models and macro model devices were 
used for Monte Carlo. The TT corner was used since Monte Carlo was already taking process into 
account.  
Each Monte Carlo run contains 1000 unique cells/samples and is challenged 100 times. Cells that 
always respond with logic 1 or always respond with logic 0 are considered perfect cells. The number of 
perfect cells out of 1000 is the metric used to qualify the PUF. This chapter explains the testbenches as 
well as the PUF schemes being used 
3.1 Transient Noise 
Transient noise is added to the simulation or else the results would be perfect. The noise is 
generated from the MOSFETs based on their models. The important settings in Spectre are the NFmax 
and NFmin. The NFmax dictates the maximum bandwidth of the noise and the noise power above this 
frequency is 0. The NFmin is the lowest frequency that considers coloured noise so any frequencies below 
NFmin only contain white noise.  A high enough NFmax is necessary and must contain the region of interest 
which is the rising/falling edge of the challenge. In the real world NFmax would be infinity but since 
simulations are really discrete systems, simulation time step is limited to 1/ (2*NFmax) or the shortest time 
step determined by Spectre. Previous simulations used an NFmax that was 10x the VDD signal frequency 
but resulted in highly optimistic results that did not have noise.  
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3.2 VGS Dependency 
During ramp up, all devices are in subthreshold and mismatch between pullup PMOS and pulldown 
NMOS devices determines what start up value is favored. In the 6T SRAM cell, the ramp up initially 
causes nodes Q and QB to rise equally before splitting.  Our theory suggests that during this time, the 
devices with larger VGS determine the start up value. Sizing accordingly, it would be possible to isolate 
dependence of mismatch to either N1 and N0 or P1 and P0.  
 
Figure 3.1 Vgs dependency analysis 
Figure 3.1 shows a case where the PMOS is sized such that they are stronger than NMOS devices. As 
VDD ramps up, VQ and VQb will be closer to VDD than ground. This implies that the VGS of NMOS devices 
is larger than PMOS devices and that NMOS mismatch determines PUF reliability. 
3.3 Isolated Mismatch Experiment 
In this experiment, local mismatch from certain devices is disabled meaning that their threshold 
voltage is nominal. The results can indicate which transistors play a dominant role during PUF operation. 
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Mismatch is disabled for NMOS or PMOS transistors and these cases will be called ideal NMOS and 
ideal PMOS respectively.  
 As VDD is rising up in the 6T SRAM cell, Q and QB initially rise together at approximately the 
same rate. If the voltage of Q and QB are lower than VDD/2, this implies that PMOS devices have a larger 
VGS and determine PUF reliability. 
3.4 6T VDD Manipulation 
 
Figure 3.2 6T VDD manipulation PUF testbench schematic 
In the 6T VDD manipulation scheme, VDD is ramped up to issue the challenge. The bit lines and 
word line of the 6T cell are connected to ground to isolate it. No read is performed so the measurements 
are done by probing the storage nodes of the SRAM cell. Switches are used to perform a purge of all 
charge within the storage nodes at the beginning of a PUF cycle. This is done to decrease simulation time 
since the time for a complete discharge is very long. The timing of the discharge is made so that it does 
not overlap the ramp up phase which prevents interference with the results. Also because we are 





Figure 3.3 6T VDD manipulation PUF cycle 
The PUF cycle begins with a discharge of the internal nodes with DIS (red) going high and turning 
on the switches to discharge Q and QB (cyan and green).  Here the nodes are already discharged since it 
is the start of the simulation but the second rising edge of DIS shows the discharging taking place. Next 
VDD (yellow) starts to rise and so do Q and QB at an equal rate in relation to each other. Q and QB 
eventually diverge when they pass the threshold voltage and the cell latches to one of the stable states. In 
this example, it latches towards a logic 1 (Q=1). 
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3.5 6T GND Manipulation 
 
Figure 3.4 6T GND manipulation PUF testbench schematic 
In the 6T GND manipulation scheme, VSS is ramped down while VDD is kept high. The bit lines are 
connected to VSS while the word line of the cell is connected to ground to isolate it. This is to minimize 
leakage through the access transistor as well as isolating the cell. Switches are used to perform a 
precharge of the storage nodes at the beginning of a PUF cycle. This is done to ensure a strong 1 is 
present within the cell since passing VDD through NMOS transistors results in a logic 1 degradation. The 
timing of the precharge is made so that it does not overlap the ramp up phase. Also because we are 




Figure 3.5 6T GND manipulation PUF cycle 
The PUF cycle begins with a precharge of the internal nodes with PRE (red) going high and turning 
on the switches to precharge Q and QB (cyan and green) to VDD. Next VSS (yellow) starts to fall and so do 
Q and QB at an equal rate in relation to each other. Q and QB eventually diverge when they pass the 





3.6 8T VDD Manipulation 
 
Figure 3.6 8T VDD manipulation PUF testbench schematic 
In the 8T VDD manipulation scheme, VDD is ramped up to issue the challenge. The bit lines and 
word line of the 8T cell are connected to ground to isolate it. No read is performed so the measurements 
are done by probing the storage nodes of the 8T SRAM cell. Switches are used to perform a purge of all 
charge within the storage nodes at the beginning of a PUF cycle. This is done to decrease simulation time 
since transient noise significantly increases the duration of the simulation. The timing of the discharge is 
made so that it does not overlap the ramp up phase. Also because we are concerned with the ramp up 





Figure 3.7 8T VDD manipulation PUF cycle 
The PUF cycle begins with a discharge of the internal nodes with DIS (red) going high and turning 
on the switches to discharge Q, QB, Q2 and Q2B (green , purple, cyan and blue respectively).  Here the 
nodes are already discharged since it is the start of the simulation but the second rising edge of DIS shows 
the discharging taking place. Next VDD(yellow) starts to rise and so do the storage nodes at an equal rate 
in relation to each other. The storage nodes eventually diverge when they pass the threshold voltage and 




3.7 8T GND Manipulation 
 
Figure 3.8 8T GND manipulation PUF testbench schematic 
In the 8T GND manipulation scheme, VSS is ramped up while VDD is kept high. The bit lines are 
connected to VSS. One main difference between this and the 6T GND manipulation testbench is that the 
wordline is now ramped as well since it is connected to the source instead of the gate. Switches are used 
to perform a precharge a strong 1 at the beginning of a PUF cycle. The timing of the precharge is made so 





Figure 3.9 8T GND manipulation PUF cycle 
The PUF cycle begins with a precharge of the internal nodes with PRE (red) going high and turning 
on the switches to discharge Q, QB, Q2 and Q2B (green , purple, cyan and blue respectively).  Here the 
nodes are initially high since VSS is also initially high. The simulator assumes this is the state of the 
system for an infinite amount of time in order to calculate the initial conditions. Next VDD(yellow) starts 
to fall and so do the storage nodes at an equal rate in relation to each other. The storage nodes eventually 
diverge when they pass the threshold voltage and the cell latches to one of the stable states. In this 
example, it latches towards a logic 0 (Q=Q2=0). 
3.8 Split-VDD Experiment 
With the 8T SRAM cell, it is possible to power up using two ramp signals with a delay between 
them.  As seen in figure Error! Reference source not found., outer PMOS devices P3 and P4 are 
controlled by VDD1 and inner PMOS devices P1 and P2 are controlled by VDD2. By introducing a delay 
between VDD1 and VDD2, the SUV values can be determined by inner or outer devices. Since SRAM PUFs 
are considered weak PUFs since they only have one challenge, this method can increase the number of 








Figure 3.11 Split VDD PUF challenge VDD1 ramps up first 
Here, VDD1 (purple) for the outer PMOS devices ramp up first. VDD2 begins to rise 2.5ns after VDD1 
begins to rise. What is interesting the splitting of Q2 and Q2B (green and cyan) is very gradual and does 
not latch until VDD2 is almost finished ramping up. This is because N3 and N4 do not form a latch and 
need to wait until N1 and N2 latches Q and QB (yellow and blue) 
 
Figure 3.12 Split VDD PUF challenge VDD2 ramps up first 
Here, as VDD2 rises Q and QB rise together and split very quickly due to the presence of a half 
latch. Since VDD1 has not risen yet, Q2 and Q2B are close to VSS which maximizes the VGS of PMOS 
transistors P1 and P2. 
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3.9 Simulation settings 
These settings are the baseline settings that are used unless otherwise specified: 
 
Table 3.1 Simulation settings 
Setting Nominal Value 
Period 20 ns 
Rise time 5 ns 
Cycles 100 cycles 
VDD 1 V 
NFmax 2 GHz 
NFmin 10 kHz 
T 27C 






Simulation Results and Comparative analysis 
4.1 VGS Dependency Analysis 
During the challenge phase, the storage node voltages will be equal for some time before latching. 
It is hypothesized that while the value of VGS while the storage nodes are still equal can affect PUF 
reliability. Nominal simulations recorded VGS in relation to the VDD ramp-up to predict which devices 
have a higher influence on start up values. We will call the devices with a higher influence the dominant 
devices. 
4.1.1 VDD manipulation 
For VDD manipulation in 6T, the storage nodes are shown since VGS of the pulldown devices is 
simply the voltage of the storage nodes themselves and the VGS of the pullup devices are VDD minus the 
storage node voltage. This means that if it is above VDD/2 then NMOS devices are dominant and vice 
versa. 
 
Figure 4.1 6T 200nm NMOS 200nm PMOS 
In this simulation, observe that the voltages of Q and QB (yellow and green) are below VDD/2 
(125mV). This makes sense since NMOS and PMOS are sized equally but NMOS transistors have higher 
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mobility so the cell is better at keeping the node low during power up. Therefore this predicts that PMOS 
transistor mismatch is dominant. 
 
Figure 4.2 6T 200nm NMOS 600nm PMOS 
In this simulation, observe that the voltages of Q and QB (green and cyan) are above VDD/2 
(125mV). PMOS devices here are 3x the size of NMOS devices. Therefore this predicts that NMOS 





Figure 4.3 6T 120nm NMOS 120nm PMOS 
With minimum sized devices, the voltage of the storage nodes is very similar to the case with 
200nm devices. Again, PMOS devices are dominant due to the larger VGS. 
 
For 8T SRAM cell waveforms, the VGS of each device is plotted and there are only VGS plots since 
each device shares a gate with another device of the same type. 
 
Figure 4.4 8T 200nm NMOS 200nm PMOS 
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During ramp up, the VGS of PMOS transistors (cyan and blue) is larger than the VGS of NMOS 
devices (green and yellow). This is due to a stronger NMOS device that sinks more current than the 
PMOS sources. This predicts that PMOS mismatch will be dominant 
 
 
Figure 4.5 6T 200nm NMOS 600nm PMOS 
During ramp up, the VGS of NMOS transistors (green and yellow) is larger than the VGS of PMOS 
devices (cyan and blue). This is due to a stronger PMOS device that sources more current than the NMOS 




Figure 4.6 8T 120nm NMOS 120nm PMOS 
During ramp up, the VGS of PMOS transistors (cyan and blue) is larger than the VGS of NMOS 
devices (green and yellow). This is due to a stronger NMOS device that sinks more current than the 
PMOS sources. This predicts that PMOS mismatch will be dominant 
4.1.2 GND manipulation 
 
Figure 4.7 6T 200nm NMOS 200nm PMOS 
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During the ramp down of VSS(red), the VGS of PMOS transistors (cyan and blue) is larger than the 
VGS of NMOS devices (green and yellow). This is due to a stronger NMOS device that sinks more current 
than the PMOS sources. This predicts that PMOS mismatch will be dominant 
 
 
Figure 4.8 6T 200nm NMOS 600nm PMOS 
During the ramp down of VSS(red), the VGS of NMOS transistors (green and yellow) is larger than 
the VGS of PMOS devices (cyan and blue). This is due to a stronger PMOS device that sources more 





Figure 4.9 6T 120nm NMOS 120nm PMOS 
This case is very similar to the first 6T GND manipulation case due to the equal sizing of NMOS 
and PMOS devices. Therefore it is predicted that PMOS mismatch will be dominant. 
 
Figure 4.10 8T 200nm NMOS 200nm PMOS 
During the ramp down of VSS (red), the VGS of PMOS transistors (cyan and blue) is larger than the 
VGS of NMOS devices (green and yellow). This is due to a stronger NMOS device that sinks more current 





Figure 4.11 8T 200nm NMOS 600nm PMOS 
During the ramp down of VSS (red), the VGS of NMOS transistors (green and yellow) is larger than 
the VGS of PMOS devices (cyan and blue). This is due to a stronger PMOS device that sources more 





Figure 4.12 8T 120nm NMOS 120nm PMOS 
This case is very similar to the first 8T GND manipulation case due to the equal sizing of NMOS 
and PMOS devices. Therefore it is predicted that PMOS mismatch will be dominant.  
Table 4.1  VGS dependency analysis summary 
Width Scheme 
NMOS PMOS 6T VDD 8T VDD 6T GND 8T GND 
200nm  200nm PMOS PMOS PMOS PMOS 
200nm  600nm NMOS NMOS NMOS NMOS 
120nm  120nm PMOS PMOS PMOS PMOS 
The summary table outlines which device mismatch is dominant in each case. This analysis shows 
a consistent prediction across different cells and challenge schemes. The relative sizing of pull up PMOS 
devices to NMOS devices affects which type of device is the deciding factor in PUF quality. However, in  
Table 4.2, the 8T cell shows noticeably smaller ∆VGS values when PMOS and NMOS are equally 





Table 4.2 ∆VGS dependence summary 
Width Scheme 
NMOS PMOS 6T VDD 8T VDD 6T GND 8T GND 
200nm  200nm 50mV 14mV 43mV 17mV 
200nm  600nm -36mV -66mV -50mV -23mV 
120nm  120nm 46mV 11mV 40mV 19mV 
 
4.2 Isolated Mismatch Results 
These results are meant to show whether NMOS or PMOS mismatch is the determinant of PUF 
reliability. It is expected that when a mismatch is disabled for certain devices, the assured response will 
drop drastically. When non-dominant devices are made ideal, they should slightly drop the assured 
response but not to the same degree as dominant devices. The range of results is 0-100% which represents 
the number of cells out of 1000 that respond with the same value over 100 cycles. 
4.2.1 VDD manipulation 
Table 4.3 Isolated mismatch results: 200nm NMOS 200nm PMOS  
Temp 8T 6T 
Ideal NMOS 63.5 74.9 
Baseline 75.4 76.8 
Ideal PMOS 64.4 40.7 
For the baseline result, 8T shows similar degradation in assured response while 6T shows a large 
degradation when using ideal PMOS devices. Looking at Figure Error! Reference source not found. the 
VGS of PMOS is 50mV higher than that of NMOS. While in Error! Reference source not found. the VGS 
of PMOS is about 15mV larger than that of NMOS. This smaller delta can be attributed to why 8T does 




Table 4.4 Isolated mismatch results: 200nm NMOS 600nm PMOS  
Temp 8T 6T 
Ideal NMOS 20.3 53.6 
Baseline 82.8 81.8 
Ideal PMOS 79.2 80.9 
 
Table 4.5 Isolated mismatch results: 120nm NMOS 120nm PMOS 
Temp 8T 6T 
Ideal NMOS 62.7 77.0 
Baseline 76.1 78.0 
Ideal PMOS 67.5 47.0 
 
4.2.2 GND manipulation 
 Table 4.6 Isolated mismatch results: 200nm NMOS 200nm PMOS  
Temp 8T 6T 
Ideal NMOS 60.2 69.7 
Baseline 76.3 76.1 





Table 4.7 Isolated mismatch results: 200nm NMOS 600nm PMOS 
Temp 8T 6T 
Ideal NMOS 20.6 44.5 
Baseline 83.4 82.9 
Ideal PMOS 79.6 82.9 
 
Table 4.8 Isolated mismatch results: 120nm NMOS 120nm PMOS  
Temp 8T 6T 
Ideal NMOS 63.9 69.6 
Baseline 76.9 77.7 
Ideal PMOS 68.2 61.8 
 
Table 4.9 Isolated mismatch summary 
Width Scheme 
NMOS PMOS 6T VDD 8T VDD 6T GND 8T GND 
200nm  200nm PMOS even PMOS even 
200nm  600nm NMOS NMOS NMOS NMOS 
120nm  120nm PMOS even PMOS PMOS 
From this experiment when the PMOS is 600nm, the predictions matched perfectly, but for other 
sizes, the 8T cell showed an even dependence on NMOS and PMOS. Recall that in  
Table 4.2, the 8T cell shows a positive ∆VGS but is much smaller than the rest when sized equally. 
4.3 Sizing Sweep Results 
The results from the isolated mismatch experiment showed strong results when the PMOS device 
was upsized. Sizing sweeps were done on each cell/scheme but a limited number of data points were 
simulated due to the high cost in computational resources.  
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Table 4.10 Input space 
Width   
NMOS PMOS  Wp/Wn ratio 
120nm  600nm  5 
200nm  600nm  3 
200nm  200nm  1 
600nm 200nm  1/3 




Figure 4.13 Sizing effect on assured response at 27 °C 
From the figure above, it is clear that used non-equal sizing of PMOS and NMOS provides much better 
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The 6T cell more often than not performs better than the 8T cell. Although 1000 samples were used for 
each data point, using a different seed can result in about 4% difference. 
4.3.1 Effect of supply noise 
 
Figure 4.14 Sizing sweep with supply noise 
The addition of supply noise degrades the assured response by an average of 1.6%. Overall supply noise 
































Figure 4.15 Assured response with supply noise 
4.3.2 Effect of temperature 
 

























































Figure 4.17 Sizing effect on assured response at -40°C 
4.3.3 Uniqueness analysis 
 





















































The y axis shows the difference in logic 1s and logic 0s out of all samples with 100% 
reproducibility. This result shows an even distribution of 1s and 0s where the ideal result is 0. Any 
deviation is due to a limited number of samples. 5000 samples were simulated and show less than 1% 
difference in the distribution of 1s and 0s. It has been seen that as the number of samples increases, the 
delta approaches zero (i.e. equal number of 1s and 0s). This result should be obvious as no post layout 
simulations were done that would capture asymmetry. 
4.4 Split-VDD Results 
Previously, only two design parameters were varied which were PMOS and NMOS width. With 8T 
Split VDD there are now two PMOS widths that can be separately varied as well as the delay between the 
two VDD signals. In total there are now four design parameters to be considered. 
 
Figure 4.19 Split VDD sizing effect when VDD2 rises first 
The plot above shows the assured response for different sizing configurations. Smaller widths are shown 

































and observing where each size intersects the line. Notice the highest assured responses occur with an 
upsized NMOS (blue square) and small inner PMOS (green triangle). 
 
Figure 4.20 Split VDD sizing effect when VDD1 rises first 
Comparing Error! Reference source not found. to Error! Reference source not found., it is much 
more beneficial to have VDD2 rise first.  The best result is around 86.0% when VDD1 rises first but 90.5% 
when VDD2 rises first. This makes sense since the inner nodes have an NMOS half latch to provide 
positive feedback 
4.4.1 Best candidate comparison 
Table 4.11 Best candidate sizing 
  Width 
Cell  PMOS Inner PMOS Outer PMOS NMOS 































8T  600nm n/a n/a 120nm 
6T  120nm n/a n/a 600nm 
 
4.4.1.1 Temperature sweep 
A temperature sweep is done using the best performing cell for 8T with Split VDD, 8T and 6T.
 
Figure 4.21 Temperature sweep comparison 
As shown above, Split VDD outperforms over cells from -40°C to 125°C. It also exhibits more temperature 
insensitivity compared with the other cells. From -40°C to 125°C there is a 6.0% drop for Split VDD while 
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4.4.1.2 Delay sweep 
 
Figure 4.22 Split VDD delay sweep 
Here the effect of delay on the assured response is measured. Recall that negative delay implies that the 
VDD2, or inner PMOS VDD, rises first and vice versa. Since there is only one VDD for 6T and 8T, the best 
result is shown as a horizontal line for comparison purposes. As the delay becomes more negative, the 
reproducibility improves greatly from 71.4% to 90.6%. With -1 ns of delay, Split VDD performs better 
than the best 6T result. There is also a slight improvement by having a large positive delay of .5%. This is 
due to the fact that the outer PMOS devices are upsized and there is no NMOS half latch for the outer 































Motivated by the IoT and the ubiquitous nature of SRAM in electronics this thesis’ intent was to 
develop a design methodology to improve the PUF reliability of SRAM cells in the context of the 6T and 
8T SRAM cell. Various applications of PUFs, their role in security systems and different types of PUFs 
are discussed. Analysis of the VGS of during ramp up is performed to predict whether NMOS or PMOS 
devices are the main sources of bias in a SRAM PUF. To verify that the predictions via VGS analysis are 
accurate, reliability simulations are performed while isolating the local mismatch to a particular type of 
transistor. The results indeed show that predictions can be made by analyzing the ∆VGS. The simulations 
also showed that having larger PMOS devices improved reliability when NMOS devices were kept the 
same. A design sweep was done on relative sizing of NMOS to PMOS to further investigate reliability 
factors. The results show that equally sized devices performed the worse and highly skewed devices 
performed the best. A 9% improvement in reliability is shown in the 6T VDD case. 6T overall performs 
better than 8T in this test but improvements can be made to the 8T to improve performance. The split VDD 
technique takes advantage of multiple VDD rails in the 8T cell and introduces a delay between two VDD 
signals. It is much more beneficial to have the inner VDD rise first. This is because the inner nodes have an 
NMOS half latch to provide positive feedback. Split VDD performs 3% better than the best 6T VDD design 
and is more robust over temperature. There are some limitations to this research. The scope of the 
simulations is at the cell level, meaning that no SRAM periphery circuitry was included. This was done to 
limit the number of variables that could influence the results and also speed up simulation run time. The 
run time of the simulations was also a limitation since transient noise greatly increases the number of 
computations needed. A balance had to be made between run time and accuracy. The layout of the cell 
was not considered in these results. This is because having layout could skew the uniqueness depending 
on how symmetrical the design is. Monte Carlo simulations were used to generate local mismatch 
between transistors but global variations were not considered in order to limit computation time. 
Further work can include creating a test chip based on this methodology, practical implementation 
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